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| International Human Rights and Political Realism in the 21st Century |
 PRINTABLE VERSION |
Having made mention of such apparent issues, it would be important to provide a proposal, by which human rights principles can be adhered to more effectually on an empirical level. Firstly, it is necessary to abolish mechanisms, which facilitate omission of action. Such mechanisms can be exemplified through the use of the veto power, which all permanent members of the Security Council possess. The exercise of such a power has indeed created the necessary arrangements for omission of action. Once more, the paper will employ the Israeli case to illustrate this point. Between 1972 and 1990, the U.S. has employed its veto power in thirty instances to protect its strategic ally in the Middle East from Council criticism, under Chapter Six provisions. To understand this point, the paper will distinguish between Chapter Six, and Chapter Seven provisions. The former deals with the peaceful “resolution” of disputes, and entitles the Council to make non-binding recommendations to achieve resolution. The latter, however, empowers the Council to take action, including warlike action, to enforce peace, where it has been threatened with aggression. Having made this distinction, it is significant to point out that none of the Resolutions relating to the Israeli breach of human rights laws emanate from Chapter Seven provisions. It is no surprise, then, that no significant action has been taken to alleviate the serious human rights issues prevalent in Palestine. And, it would seem that if crucial steps were taken to change this trend, exercise of the veto power would act as an impediment to its realization.
Hence, the paper proposes that such exercises be discarded from practice, if any progress is to be made in justly treating human rights breaches around the globe. Not only would this change create leeway for a more just treatment of human rights violations, but it would also serve to depoliticize the procedure, by which the status quo “protects” human rights (as well as the national interests of powerful states). Aside from discarding the exercise of the veto power, it is also necessary to modify the type of enforcement methods utilized to compel deviant states such as Iraq to comply with human rights norms, without contradicting the principles, for which action is being taken. For instance, the imposition of economic sanctions against Iraq has not distinguished between impact on the political, or military circles, and the civilian population. According to sources, the consequential rise in infant mortality in the country from 47 per 1000 live births in 1990, to 108 per 1000 live births in 1994, can be attributed to the indiscriminate sanctions, which have been imposed.
Keeping such disturbing figures in mind, it would be logical to put forth a proposal for a disparate type of sanctions, which would be more discriminate in its infliction of impact. For instance, rather than targeting the entire population with placing a ban on crucial imports (it is important to note here that the Food-for-Oil agreement under Resolutions 706 and 712 provided only $1.7 million of food importation; half of Iraq’s annual requirement), sanctions should target a reduction in activities such as military endeavors. This can be achieved through taking such measures as imposing an arms embargo on a state, which has disregarded human rights norms by violating them. This would result in a favorable reduction of military activity in a “rogue” state, and would act as an effective enforcement mechanism, in response to human rights breaches. The adoption of such a measure, unlike the economic sanctions in place, would not itself violate human rights norms, with the intention of guarding them. Secondly, it would not violate such compacts as the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions on the laws of war, which prohibits economic sieges against civilians as a method of warfare. However, it seems as if breaches of human rights treaties are unimportant, and second in priority, when the national interests of powerful states, and power politics, form the prevalent global order.
In conclusion, there exists a paradoxical arrangement, which reflects the empirical failure of the application of international human rights norms, simultaneous with a success of such norms with reference to normative grounds. The inherent weaknesses, which shape the U.N.’s efforts in applying human rights laws upon states, facilitate manipulation by powerful states. Such exploitive, opportunistic measures such as leading a military coalition against Iraq for the actualization of a domestic political agenda serve to corroborate this point. The paper has employed the Iraqi case as an example of an instance, in which action has been taken, and has subsequently used the Israeli case to bring into light inaction, as a response to human rights breaches by the two states. The paper has attempted to make it increasingly clear that both commission, and omission, have been the direct results of advancing the national interests of powerful states, such as the U.S. and U.K. This portrays the politicization of the international process of adhering to human rights laws, and illustrates the phenomenon of enforcement as an instrumental tool in realizing national economic and political goals. The paper has made simple proposals, which would serve to depoliticize the procedures in question, and rectify global enforcement in ways, which would serviceably target the political elite, and not the civilian population of a state, which has offended human rights principles.
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Nima Shirali
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