It would be logical to assert that such exploitations of the concept of human rights can be simultaneous with witnessing a lucid contradiction of its fundamental convincement. This article will commence by attempting to illuminate the root causes, which foster state manipulation of the concepts in question, and will subsequently proceed to illustrate this contradiction employing two instances. The two instances, namely that of U.N. resolutions against Iraq, which have been a cause of action (commission), and U.N. resolutions against Israel, which have been responded to with inaction (omission). After a thorough analysis, it will conclude with a succinct proposal, which could be utilized to prevent repetition of trends, which have materially contradicted the principles of human rights.
As indicated, the first section of the paper will be devoted to elucidating the root causes of the failure in empirically applying universalized human rights. The results of careful observation would support the notion that this failure has indeed been the result of success. This paradoxical assertion has as its grounds for justification the (seldom) universal acceptance of the human rights doctrines on a normative level, which signifies success, and their violation, which signifies failure on an empirical level. In other words, in the context of international human rights, failure in application has ironically been the result of success in promotion. This ‘success’, which is alluded to, can be illustrated through state ratifications of numerous human rights treaties, which signifies their acceptance of the content of the treaties on a normative level, and their violations of the treaties, which signifies a failure for the treaties to become applicable on empirical grounds. To illustrate this point, one can view Malaysia’s ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child as a suitable example. Malaysia’s delegation to the U.N. made his country a signor to the Convention in 1995, five years after it came into force, and by doing so put forth the symbolic image of Malaysia’s respect for the Convention, and the country’s willing to adhere to its content.
This having been mentioned, it is also worth mentioning that not only has the government of Prime Minister Mahathir failed to adhere to the content of the Convention, yet has materially contravened it in many significant respects. The most significant respect, by which the Malaysian government has contravened the Convention, is by its receptive stance pertinent to allowing foreign investment into the country. The paper does not argue that foreign investment into developing countries like Malaysia is always in opposition with the protection of human rights, but will attempt to point out a clear violation in the case of Malaysia. The government of this country has welcomed the investment of transnational corporations such as Nike and Reebok, which in turn have unlawfully exploited Malaysia’s children. This has been the case with respect to compelling a large portion of them to toil in factories under unjust conditions for long periods of time, at times twelve hours a day, with scheduled bathroom breaks. This is starkly in contrast with Section 1 of Article 19 of the Convention, which explicitly states: “State Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment, or exploitation”. It is unquestionable that the exploitation of a child in Malaysia, which is the direct result of unlawful child labour, formulates a stark encroachment of this section of the Convention. Yet, the Malaysian government has not been threatened with the imposition of economic sanctions, nor has it been threatened on military grounds for its blatant breach of the Convention. This example corroborates the assertion that there has been inadequacy in terms of adhering to an international treaty on empirical grounds, and that this inadequacy has been subsequent, and the result of, the success of the treaty on normative grounds. The failure has been made manifest through the stark violation of Article 19, while the success through the acceptance of the terms, and the ratification of the treaty.
Aside from the normative success of international mechanisms aimed to promote, and safeguard human rights, the lack of a deterrence mechanism has also served to be a contributory factor in the failure of applying such mechanisms on empirical grounds. It is important, however, to make a clear distinction between the lacks of a deterrence mechanism, with the lack of an enforcement mechanism. It is apparently clear that the massive air strikes conducted by U.N. coalitions against such states as Iraq have forced such states to comply with U.N. resolutions demanding their disarmament. It can be argued that such instances as the 1998 U.N. bombing of Iraq have indeed acted as methods, by which U.N. resolutions have, and can be enforced. One can assert that such measures as the use of military force have served as an enforcement mechanism since they have been carried out with the intention of constraining states to comply with Resolutions, and that since compliance was the objective of the air strikes, which were carried out. After all, the purpose of enforcement in the legal context has been to ascertain adherence to prescribed laws; precisely the purpose of past air strikes against Iraq.
It is also important to discern the dissimilarity between deterrence and punishment. Many will assert that the carrying out of air strikes against Iraq should not be viewed as an enforcement mechanism, but as a mechanism by which punishment can be imposed upon a state, which has failed to accede to international law. However, the fact remains that a military attack on a state such as Iraq will deceptively resemble punishment, yet it is not so. It would be logical to adopt the view that military action initiated by an ulterior force would indeed assist in strengthening the grip of the power of a dictator such as Hussein, for it unifies his populace against the outside force, and contributes to direct attention away from the repressive domestic environment. To further inquire into the matter, one can argue that military action against a dictator would serve to facilitate conditions beneficial for the leader. Hence, in the context of adhering to international human rights principles, there is a lack of a deterrence mechanism, and this contributes to a failure of the application of such principles on empirical grounds. The fact that the world has been witness to extensive military campaigns against countries such as Iraq illustrates that such attacks have been the unavoidable result of a lack of a deterrence mechanism in adhering to human rights principles. It also illustrates that in the context of international human rights law, enforcement is subsequent to the failure of deterrence, or in the case in question, subsequent to the lack of deterrence. Therefore, the issue of deterrence serves as another example of the failure of implementing human rights principles on empirical grounds. As well, it serves as an example of how fundamental human rights principles are paradoxically violated in the course of enforcement with the acclaimed intention of preserving them. The issue of ironically infringing upon the fundamentals of human rights law for the sake of preserving them will be alluded to in the next section of the paper. The essay now proceeds to discuss how certain states have adeptly manipulated the flaw of the lack of a deterrence mechanism, along with the general claim of honoring human rights principles, to actualize their national interests.
The first example, which will be drawn, pertains to the case of the imposition of economic sanctions, and the execution of military strikes against Iraq. It will be argued that such phenomena undoubtedly illustrate actions, which have been beneficial for states such as the U.S. and U.K., while having created a humanitarian disaster in the victim countries. In the case of Iraq, one can witness a commission of actions, which have been the consequence of Resolutions such as 661, which was adopted in 1990. This Resolution was adopted by the Security Council in response to Hussein’s incursion into Kuwait, and decreed that a ban be placed on all imports and exports except, “for supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs”. However, figures illustrate that after the imposition of sanctions, Iraq has been importing only $33 million of drugs (mostly donated by international agencies), while this figure was $360 million prior to the sanctions. Having made mention of this, it would not be difficult to discern one cause for the humanitarian disaster in Iraq. The adoption of the Resolution in question, which facilitated the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi children, came subsequent to Desert Storm; a massive military strike, which destroyed a significant portion of Iraq’s civilian infrastructure. Both the military attacks and the imposition of sanctions have been the direct result of the nonsuccess of human rights norms to be applied on empirical grounds.
A deterrence mechanism, which would act to restrain Hussein from violating Kuwait’s national borders, did not exist. As a result, the world witnessed a foreseeable, brutal invasion of a weak, oil-rich country by its powerful, and bankrupt, neighbor. Hussein’s invasion, which in itself violated fundamental human rights of the people of Kuwait, created leeway for a situation, which could be exploited for the benefit of the powerful states, which participated in mounting a military attack against Iraq. The benefit, which will be alluded to here, is what scholars of international relations have referred to as ‘degree of proximity’. This concept asserts that powerful states have decisive interests in attaining, and maintaining a level of geographic adjacency to other states, which are of significant strategic importance. Having this in mind, it is undoubtedly stark that the U.S., which led the coalition against Iraq in 1990, would have an interest in acquiring degree of proximity to Russia, Israel and Iran, through a consequential military presence in Iraq. Scholars such as Goldstein have correctly asseverated that significant political and economic leverage can be exerted upon surrounding states, once degree of proximity has been achieved. It seems clear that such leverages have indeed been exercised upon such states as Pakistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan in light of recent American demands aimed at waging ‘war on terror’. It is important to attribute this to the justification that powerful states, such as the U.S., have employed to account for their actions. To relate this to the point in question, such justifications emanate from the success of international human rights norms in the normative realm, yet facilitate a failure in the empirical realm.
Aside from the case of Iraq, which illustrates an instance of commission, it is noteworthy to allude to the case relevant to Israel, which illustrates omission. The terms used here refer to the action, in the case of Iraq, and the inaction, in the case of Israel, to protect human rights as decreed by U.N. Resolutions. As before, instances of omission need to be carefully observed, keeping in mind the desire of powerful states to actualize their national interests. Between 1955 and 1992, sixty-five U.N. Resolutions have been passed in relation to Israel’s adamant violation of human rights in the Palestinian territories, which it occupies. Amongst these has been Resolution 726, which has strongly condemned Israel’s illegal deportation of countless Palestinians. Israel’s illegal act of deportation unquestionably defies the economic, social and cultural rights of the Palestinians, which were deported, and in turn, undoubtedly requires enforcement. However, unlike the case alluded to earlier, Israel’s disregard and defiance of such constitutive human rights have been avoided by omission. Despite Israel’s ignorance of the sixty-five Resolutions passed condemning its actions and demanding that the state conform to universalized human rights norms, no substantial action, which would act as enforcement, has been taken as a response. Once more, this case serves as an example of the politicization of the invaluable concept of the protection of human rights. It would be accurate to conclude that it would be in the best interests of powerful members of the Security Council, such as the U.S. and the U.K. not to act, when a state of strategic significance, such as Israel, has defied human rights laws. This strategic significance, which is owed to Israel, derives from advantageous economic and political ties, which it shares with powerful members of the U.N. The two powerful states, which have been mentioned, have indicative political ties with Israel, and to initiate military action against such an ally would unequivocally jeopardize those ties.
Such ties, which are mutually beneficial, extend into the economic realm as well. Israel remains one of the most valuable of America’s trading partners, and hence plays an influential role in the perpetuation of American interests in continuing a profitable economic relationship. According to credible sources, the U.S. is Israel’s largest single country trading partner, as Israel dominates 23% of its import market. Sources also illustrate that the trade between the two states summed up to $21 billion in 2001. Such figures are indicative of the significant economic relations between the two states, and lay the foundation for explicating blatant inaction, despite Israel’s defiance of international human rights laws. Such explications can be attributed to the political and economic interests in preserving beneficial relations with states, which have strategic importance. Furthermore, an American-led coalition aiming to force Israel to comply to any one of the sixty-five Resolutions demanding “immediate and unconditional” action from the Israeli state would be threatening to the beneficial relations between the two sides. Hence, one becomes witness to omission, or refraining from action, which in turn acts as yet another example of the failure of human rights norms to be administered in the empirical realm.
Having made mention of such apparent issues, it would be important to provide a proposal, by which human rights principles can be adhered to more effectually on an empirical level. Firstly, it is necessary to abolish mechanisms, which facilitate omission of action. Such mechanisms can be exemplified through the use of the veto power, which all permanent members of the Security Council possess. The exercise of such a power has indeed created the necessary arrangements for omission of action. Once more, the paper will employ the Israeli case to illustrate this point. Between 1972 and 1990, the U.S. has employed its veto power in thirty instances to protect its strategic ally in the Middle East from Council criticism, under Chapter Six provisions. To understand this point, the paper will distinguish between Chapter Six, and Chapter Seven provisions. The former deals with the peaceful “resolution” of disputes, and entitles the Council to make non-binding recommendations to achieve resolution. The latter, however, empowers the Council to take action, including warlike action, to enforce peace, where it has been threatened with aggression. Having made this distinction, it is significant to point out that none of the Resolutions relating to the Israeli breach of human rights laws emanate from Chapter Seven provisions. It is no surprise, then, that no significant action has been taken to alleviate the serious human rights issues prevalent in Palestine. And, it would seem that if crucial steps were taken to change this trend, exercise of the veto power would act as an impediment to its realization.
Hence, the paper proposes that such exercises be discarded from practice, if any progress is to be made in justly treating human rights breaches around the globe. Not only would this change create leeway for a more just treatment of human rights violations, but it would also serve to depoliticize the procedure, by which the status quo “protects” human rights (as well as the national interests of powerful states). Aside from discarding the exercise of the veto power, it is also necessary to modify the type of enforcement methods utilized to compel deviant states such as Iraq to comply with human rights norms, without contradicting the principles, for which action is being taken. For instance, the imposition of economic sanctions against Iraq has not distinguished between impact on the political, or military circles, and the civilian population. According to sources, the consequential rise in infant mortality in the country from 47 per 1000 live births in 1990, to 108 per 1000 live births in 1994, can be attributed to the indiscriminate sanctions, which have been imposed.
Keeping such disturbing figures in mind, it would be logical to put forth a proposal for a disparate type of sanctions, which would be more discriminate in its infliction of impact. For instance, rather than targeting the entire population with placing a ban on crucial imports (it is important to note here that the Food-for-Oil agreement under Resolutions 706 and 712 provided only $1.7 million of food importation; half of Iraq’s annual requirement), sanctions should target a reduction in activities such as military endeavors. This can be achieved through taking such measures as imposing an arms embargo on a state, which has disregarded human rights norms by violating them. This would result in a favorable reduction of military activity in a “rogue” state, and would act as an effective enforcement mechanism, in response to human rights breaches. The adoption of such a measure, unlike the economic sanctions in place, would not itself violate human rights norms, with the intention of guarding them. Secondly, it would not violate such compacts as the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions on the laws of war, which prohibits economic sieges against civilians as a method of warfare. However, it seems as if breaches of human rights treaties are unimportant, and second in priority, when the national interests of powerful states, and power politics, form the prevalent global order.
In conclusion, there exists a paradoxical arrangement, which reflects the empirical failure of the application of international human rights norms, simultaneous with a success of such norms with reference to normative grounds. The inherent weaknesses, which shape the U.N.’s efforts in applying human rights laws upon states, facilitate manipulation by powerful states. Such exploitive, opportunistic measures such as leading a military coalition against Iraq for the actualization of a domestic political agenda serve to corroborate this point. The paper has employed the Iraqi case as an example of an instance, in which action has been taken, and has subsequently used the Israeli case to bring into light inaction, as a response to human rights breaches by the two states. The paper has attempted to make it increasingly clear that both commission, and omission, have been the direct results of advancing the national interests of powerful states, such as the U.S. and U.K. This portrays the politicization of the international process of adhering to human rights laws, and illustrates the phenomenon of enforcement as an instrumental tool in realizing national economic and political goals. The paper has made simple proposals, which would serve to depoliticize the procedures in question, and rectify global enforcement in ways, which would serviceably target the political elite, and not the civilian population of a state, which has offended human rights principles.
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