This article examines the root causes of Maoist Insurgency in Nepal. There has been a lot of scholarly debates and analysis to find out the root cause of evolution of Maoist insurgency in Nepal. All of these debates, literatures and analysis are written from various perspectives. This article will review all of these debates, literature and analysis and provide you with an intensive framework to understand the root cause of evolution of Maoist Insurgency in Nepal.
1. Introduction
Land-locked between India and China, the Kingdom of Nepal is renowned for the spectacular natural beauty of her mountains and for her culture of tolerance and peace symbolized by Lumbini, the birthplace of Lord Buddha. It is for this very reason that Nepal once declared herself a Zone of Peace.
Nepal is a poor developing country that is ailing with various social and economic ills. Up until about twelve years ago Nepal’s political system was not multi-party democracy. The prevailing political system was blamed for the country’s socio-economic ills. Democracy was seen as the panacea and it has become Nepal’s great hope. Although political parties were banned the pro-democracy movement was continuing. From the onset this was centered at educational institutions of higher learning where the country’s rulers tolerated it. Students and teachers were at the forefront of democratic struggle.
Pro-democratic movement gathered much strength in late 1989 and the late King Birendra finally acceded to their demands giving the country a constitutional monarchy and multi-party democratic system. Nepal now had a democratic constitution and multi-party elections. The Maoist communist party also contested in the first election and held almost a third of the seats in Nepal’s Parliament.
People had expected that much development would follow democracy. However, development did not come to fulfill the hopes of the impoverished people. Unemployment soared and along with it came disillusionment and dissent.
The Maoist seemed betrayed by the failed promises of democracy and felt powerless. In 1994, they abandoned their legislative seats and their leaders went underground. In February 1996, they declared a People’s War claiming that only a communist state could solve the country’s social and economic ills and that is how Maoist insurgency was born in this country.
After eight years of the rising tide of Maoist insurgency peace has been destroyed giving rise to widespread fear and sense of insecurity. Likewise, the linchpin of the democratic system, election of the local bodies and the national parliament has been stalled. The education institution is in shambles and the economy is on the path of destruction. The country’s social and physical infrastructures built over the years are also being gradually destroyed, eroding the capacity of the country to deliver much needed development.
Nepal is currently in the midst of arguably the most successful Maoist insurgency the world has witnessed in the recent decades. The Maoist, who appear to model themselves on Peru’s Shining Path guerrillas, have shaken the country’s 14-year old, multiparty democracy to its very foundation. On November 23, 2001, after four months of cease-fire and peace talks, the Maoists walked out of the dialogue blaming the government for not responding to any of their conditions favorably. The Maoists launched armed attacks on army barracks, police stations and other government establishments in Dang, Syangja, Surkhet and many other districts of Nepal. On November 25, the Maoists declared the formation of a 'People's Liberation Army' to carry forward the people's war. Then the government realized that the police failed to take control of the insurgency, the army has been mobilized since then.
The second round of peace talks between the Maoists and the king's government was announced in early January 2003 and was followed by a cease-fire by the both sides from January 29, 2003. The talks continued until August and the cease-fire lasted for about seven months. On the eve of the fourth round of talks, on August 17, 2003, the Royal Nepal Army conducted a raid in Doramba village of Ramechap district where Maoist cadres were reportedly holding cultural programs to spread the message of their politics. 19 unarmed Maoist cadres who were engaged in a 'cultural' program in Doramba were arrested by the army, taken outside the village and shot at point blank range in an execution-style killing. The Maoists walked out of the peace talks and the hostilities resumed.
Several scholarly debates and analysis were conduced in the past to understand the root cause of Maoist Insurgency in Nepal. Given the magnitude of the crisis, the exploration of its causes and continued success has become a subject of interest to commentators and scholars in Nepal and beyond. Popular wisdom holds that rebellion is a direct result of the increasing despondency felt by the poor and the socially marginalized in the country. While there is an element of truth in these prevailing analyses, evidence suggests that the underlying causes of the insurgency’s origins, rapid growth and continuing success are far more complex. My study has attempted to look into the origin of this conflict from the different perspective such as the socio-economic factor, trans-boundary factor and internal politics. This study looks into the Maoist revolt and explores its causes from a wider perspective, thus this study provides an intensive overview of the origin of the Maoism in Nepal and extrapolate the cause of its evolution.
2. Timeline of events
Since 1996, the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-Maoist) has been waging a “people’s war” to establish a communist republic in place of the constitutional monarchy. It is a manifestation of ideology intertwined with old age grievances resulting from inequalities embedded in the Nepali social structure. The inequality stemmed from the poverty, caste/ethnic/gender – based discrimination, political/ social oppression and corruption in public office which have contributed to the deprivation and marginalization of people, especially those of the lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder. The rebellion was localized in the Mid-Western Region and was quite indolent until 2001. In July 2001, a cease-fire was declared that was held until November 2001. When talks failed and fighting resumed a State of Emergency was declared. The fighting then entered a new phase of much greater intensity. Before November 2001, approximately 2700 people had been killed in the previous five years; between November 2001 and October 2002, 4366 people were killed.
In May 2002 Prime Minister Deuba dissolved the Parliament when it would not extend the emergency. In July 2002 the terms of all elected officials in Nepal ran out and the Prime Minister did not extend their term. In October 2002, King Gyanendra dismissed the Prime Minister and took over the executive powers. Since then the various political parties have refused to cooperate with the king’s government.
In January 2003, a cease-fire has been brokered between the king and the Maoists. The Maoist insurgency took a dark turn when rebel leaders walked out of peace talks with the government. Violence has increased considerably since that time; the country is virtually in a state of near civil war with killing going between the Maoist rebels and government security forces with ordinary people often caught in their cross-fires. Apparently both sides have realized the need for negotiated settlement but peace talks still seem remote.
3. Root causes of conflict
“There is widespread consensus as to the root causes of the conflict. The main grievances, all closely related to each other, are inequitable socio-economic and political access, bad governance/corruption and poverty. These issues are used by the Maoists to justify their challenge to the government, and all contribute to motivate certain sectors of the population to join or at least support their movement and cause.”
The new political order set up after 1990 failed to include all sections of Nepali society and the nationalities and Dalits (untouchable caste) remained, and they felt they were, outside both mainstream politics and the reach of development programs. Traditional regional disparities continued and far flung areas like the districts of Karnali Zone remained under-represented in politics, planning and the development processes. Meanwhile, the gap between the people in the villages and the cities and between the rich and the poor continues to widen. In the 90’s Nepal experienced relative prosperity in urban areas but the redistribution of wealth and opportunities remained skewed resulting in increased unemployment.
It did not take long for the insurgency launched simultaneously in three mid-western mountain districts of Rolpa, Rukum, Jajarkot, Gorkha in the West, and Sindhuli in the east to spread. By 2000, Maoist violence had affected all districts and by mid January 2001 the Maoists declared the formation of provisional revolutionary district governments in Rukum, Jajarkot, Sallyan and Rolpa districts. There are many theories on why the influence spread as fast as it did. Some attribute the spread of rebel influence to the involvement and support of hitherto excluded groups – mainly women, nationalities and the Dalits – but there is not enough evidence to isolate this as main reason. As noted by the Saubhagya Shah, the epicenter of the insurgency, the Rapti Zone in the mid-western Nepal is not the most backward region in the country. He argues that “if social and economic marginalization alone were responsible for the emergence of the Maoist Movements the hill districts of Karnali, Seti and Mahakali zones would be far more likely candidates, not only because of their grinding poverty and chronic food shortage but also because of the nature of their terrain and their remoteness from the state centers. Even though it is difficult to generalize what is almost clear now is that the spread of Maoist influence has strong social and economic roots including the exclusion of the poor and the marginalized by the State as opposed to it being only and ideological and “law and order problem”, or “terrorism” which was the initial government response to this conflict.
From one perspective, the Maoist movement, or insurgency, in its mid-western stronghold areas can be seen as a renewal of an old confrontation between the Thakuri Raj and the radical left. The Thakuris (descendants of the rulers of the old principalities) and their clients had long dominated this area and the nature of their rule at local level was repressive. This was in accord with the authoritarian regime at the center during the party less Panchayat system (1962-1990). Even after the restoration of democracy in 1990 the former Panchas survived reviving their power base under a new guise by responding to the Nepali Congress’s Policy of incorporating the traditional social and political elites in its schemes of party building. However, the sense of popular empowerment that spread after the successful 1990 Jana Andolan (People’s Movement of 1990s) introduced a new power against the traditional forces. Both the CPN (UML) and the CPN (Maoist, formerly the UPF) emerged as the most influential left forces in the people’s fight against various forms of the Thakuri Raj in this region. The equation among the left forces has changed in favor of the CPN (Maoist) as a consequence of the UML’s movement from the left towards the center while the Congress Party is constantly heading towards the right from the center in the political spectrum of the country. The local Thakuri, centrist alliances in the mainstream parties, has never been strong under the democratic set-up, and it deteriorated during the period of hung parliament (November 1994 to May 1999). Because politics were concentrated at the center in the game of government making and unmaking the parliamentary parties grossly ignored the need for the party building at the grassroots level. This was the most appropriate time for a long drawn-out people’s war.
3.1 Imbalance of Political, Social, Economic and Cultural Opportunities
“In terms of caste and ethnic break-up, the country is essentially a conglomeration of minorities, with the two largest groups comprising but 16 percent (Chhetri) and nearly 13 percent (Bahun) of the population. None of the other groups constitute more than 10 percent of the population. …Regardless of the reality on the ground, Nepal is usually represented as a Hindu kingdom where different castes as well as ethnic, linguistic and religious groups have co-existed peacefully. …However, the subordinate groups are beginning to question this picture of tolerance and pluralism. Particularly since the restoration of multi-party democracy in 1990, the open political atmosphere has allowed the emergence of an energetic movement of ethnic assertion, whose leadership might regard Nepal as a pluralistic society, but one that is characterized by hierarchy, dominance and oppression. ”
“As early as 1992, British scholar Andrew Nichson had warned in an article entitled ‘Democratization and the Growth of communism in Nepal: A Peruvian Scenario in the Making’: ‘The future prospects of Maoism in Nepal will…depend largely on the extent to which the newly elected Nepali Congress government addresses the historic neglect and discrimination of the small rural communities which still make up the overwhelming bulk of the population of the country…[which] would mean a radical shake-up of the public administration system in order to make both more representative of the ethnic diversity of the country and more responsive to the needs of peasant communities.’ ”
Another notable characteristic of Maoist movement is the degree of women’s participation in guerrilla ranks. Women’s political participation in the past had been limited to electoral areas especially in voting and occasional candidacy in elections. It is a big surprise that Nepali women now have joined guerrilla organization under arms. Why many rural women have been a part of Maoist Movement? What specific life experiences convinced or compelled the women to take part in Maoist activities? Although it is very difficult to verify the exact number it is reported that women constitute anywhere between thirty and forty percent of Maoist military force, which according to conservative estimates, total at least 10,000 people. Among the women military personnel it is reported that most come from ethnic and Dalit groups, but there are also women from the Bahun-Chhetri castes. Ideologically, the Maoist claim to favor an end to the patriarchal organization of the society. In Nepali context, it appears that this position is exemplified by their demands for equal rights for women to inherit ancestral property. In the well-known forty-point demand submitted to the government just before the declaration of people’s war (Annex–I), one point deals exclusively with the patriarchal exploitation and discrimination against women should be stopped. Daughters should be allowed to access to parental property. However, the full liberation of women and gender equality is to be achieved only in a classless or communist society. Such a position is widely explained by the Maoist to the women through political classes, ‘cultural program, the party media and mass print media. So women are the interest group who Maoist have been time and again addressed women’s need to attract them to their activities. This is totally a new phenomenon in Nepal, which must not be taken lightly.
3.2 Nepal’s Geographical Condition and Unemployment Rate
Nepal’s rugged terrain (as similar to the Afghanistan and Peru) is one of the privileged to the Maoist to grow the roots of Maoism in Nepal. The geological structure of Nepal has been very suitable for the guerilla war operation and this is one of the important factors that have led to the growth of Maoism in Nepal. The inexperienced and untrained Maoist Rebel has been several times beaten the Nepal Police and Army force due to the geographical factor.
Similarly, giving the precarious economic situation in the country, joining Maoist Movement became an attractive option for young men and women in a growing number of districts. Literacy rates had increased over the preceding decades, more school leavers failed School Leaving failed the School Leaving Certificate examinations (to be taken at the end of the tenth year of school) than passed. If the Maoist is a young people’s movement then they appear to be an alternative or ‘outfall’ option for those who consider themselves unable to gain access to the formal system. The option to join the Maoist is additionally supported by the very high degree of failure in the School Leaving Certificate so that the failed pupils cannot hope to enter positions within the government or within, the very few, enterprises. This educated unemployment which increasing at geometrical proportions every year have neither a job nor a school to go where they could be kept busy. These unemployed youth, 15 to 18 years in age, are joining the ranks of armed guerrillas. So this is one of the reasons why the Maoist has been able to recruit immensely in their so-called People’s Army.
3.3 Illegitimate, Undemocratic and Inefficient Governance
The frustrations associated with unfulfilled expectations following the replacement of absolute monarchy with multiparty democracy provided fertile ground for the Maoist movement. The lack of political and economic access has been compounded by bad governance and corruption. Despite enormous amount of funds being poured into Nepal for development, the proportion of Nepalis below the poverty line are now greater than ever before . The process of decentralization to improve governance and increase people’s participation has been implemented but has not been very effective. “The legitimacy of these structures has rested more on legal requirements and the financial and organizational “support” of the central government rather than on the stake holding of the local voters.”
“It remains Nepal’s singular misfortune that the political forces are always engrossed with changing the regime, but never with altering the substance of governance. … For the political elites and counter-elites, establishing rule-based governance and institutional procedures has so far proved less attractive than simply overthrowing the political opposition and ruling through patronage and fiat. ”
When the movement oriented political groups of the Panchayat era turned themselves into political parties, they failed to build their institution in democratic ways. While almost all of them mouthed democratic slogans none built mechanisms whereby the small illegalities of party leaders, ideologues and members could be disciplined through transparent, credible but decisive sets of intra-party rules and procedures. Some political misdemeanors were allowed to occur with impunity in each of the big parties – Nepali Congress (NC), Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist –Leninist) (CPM –UML) and Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) – were personal aggrandizement, often in the name of helping the party, was overlooked. Although opposition parties often indulged in moral posturing they too failed to come up with effective laws to tame excesses of the ruling party. The CPN (UML), which led the opposition for most of the period, was unable to create a social environment in which laws that would govern party finances -said to be the single most important source of political corruption in Nepal –could be passed. This kind of deceit on the part of the political parties contributed directly to a widespread disenchantment with the multi-arty democratic set-up, and facilitated the political arrival and growth of the Maoist.
3.4 Absence of Opportunities for the Peaceful Reconciliation of Group Interests and for Bridging Dividing Lines between Groups.
The situation in Nepal is perhaps more complicated than most, in addition to the multiparty system the monarchy is also a major player. This is especially true since the removal of the Prime Minister by the King in October 2002. Since then, the various political parties have refused to participate in the government. Of great concern is their steadfast refusal to date to participate in peace talks with the Maoists. Since many views the takeover by the King to be unconstitutional, the non-participation by the political parties is thus viewed as lack of input from the people.
3.5 Absence of an Active and Organized Civil Society
“In Nepal, where society comprises many castes, creeds and ethnic groups, strong patrimonial and patriarchal systems have long existed to perpetuate the domination of the elite. Subsidiary governance is realized only when people themselves become aware of their rights and exercise them as citizens and members of civil society to promote individual and collective well-being. ”
Regional Dynamics
It is important to understand the Maoist movement in the historical context and continuity that has thrived due to the geopolitical situation of South Asia. It is important to note here that the rulers in India had supported the pro-democracy movement in Nepal in 1950-51 when the Rana oligarchy collapsed. Again in 1990, Indian leaders arguably played a crucial role in restoring multiparty system by using a yearlong Indo-Nepal transit impasse to precipitate the collapse of the Panchayat regime. One can draw certain lessons from this experience. In spite of the Nepali state’s apparent weaknesses, it is capable of defusing domestic crises. However, whenever there is outside intervention/assistance, Nepal has been forced to make concessions. After 1990, India forced Nepal into signing several secret bilateral accords by manipulating the oppositional politics in Nepal. According to this argument the rebel leader Ram Raja Singh (during the Panchayat days) and now the Maoists are prime examples of India’s “strategic coercion” against the Nepali State. Without a base outside Nepal the Maoists will find it very hard to continue their guerilla war.
India has been supplying the Nepalese government with military hardware and training assistance. The Arms Assistance Agreement signed in 1965 to assist in reorganization and modernization of the Royal Nepal Army had the objective of strengthening the security and independence of Nepal. The agreement was in recognition of the military links between the two countries and established India as the primary supplier of arms to Nepal.
In 2004 India provided a grant of over Rs. 100 crores to Nepal to enable it buy Indian defense equipment. Nepal wanted upgrades of India-designed INSAS rifles and ammunition and an increase in the supply of advanced light helicopters and mine protection vehicles. Nepal also bought arms from Belgium, Poland and the United Kingdom.
Among the states offering this assistance India had a special interest in the curtailing the activities of the Nepalese Maoists. In India the Naxalite movement that had begun in 1967 had metamorphosed in three decades into a major movement affecting almost 159 districts in over 12 states. The merging of the People’s War Group and the Maoists Communist Center of India in 2004 to form the CPI- Maoist has become a major cause for concern. What is even more disturbing to the Indian Government is the evidence of linkages between the CPI Maoists and the Maoists of Nepal. This strategic alliance has opened up their avenues for movement of persons and materials. It has also led to the creation of safe havens and the extension of training facilities for each other. The two groups seek to create a corridor called the Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) that would stretch from Nepal to Andhra Pradesh running through Bihar, Jharkand, Chattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh. The Indian Maoists have already sufficient influence in these areas and using the infrastructure put up by them would be a boon for the Nepal Maoists. The CRZ would ensure free and easy movement for both groups.
Impact of the Conflict
Nepal borders on lawlessness. The Himalayan Kingdom of 23 million people has been wracked by the Maoist insurgency for the last seven years. Fourteen governments have taken office since the restoration of democracy in 1990 and the great expectations of the Jana Andolan-which it would usher a new era of prosperity for all, have yet to materialize due to continuing political turmoil and social unrest. Furthermore, only a small segment of the society, i.e. elites, those who were already rich to begin with, seemed to benefit disproportionately during this period. Twelve years on, the country still finds itself in near complete disarray as a result of the ongoing political, social, and economic turmoil.
The rebellion has affected every single Nepali. Unfortunately, much of the discourse on the conflict in Nepal is concentrated on its political aspect while very little attention has been given to the conflict’s socioeconomic cost. When the first peace talks between the Maoists and the government took place in 2001, the debate was exclusively on politics.
It is believed that the insurgency has cost Nepal eight to 10 percent of its GDP. Forty percent of the Village Development Committee (VDC) buildings have been destroyed and following the dissolution of local bodies by the Deuba government, local commerce and development activities have come to a grinding halt. The inadequate rural infrastructure remains in ruin including power plants, electricity grid and telecommunication towers, all prime Maoist targets. Nearly 2000 schools, mostly private, have also been periodically closed. Health centers and schools, which depend on government grants to VDCs, are without medicines and school supplies. Widespread fears of Maoists and security forces, and lack of economic opportunities have forced more than half a million people to leave their rural homes and head to district headquarters, Katmandu and even India.
In areas most affected by the insurgency there have been perceptible demographic changes. Women now head most households in the absence of men and boys as many have left homes due to fears of forced conscription by the Maoists and routine harassment by the security forces. Evidences of increasing reliance on remittance notwithstanding, many overseas Nepalis are shying away from sending money to their families in the villages due to fears of extortion.
At first, the Maoists were able to capture the public imagination with strong opposition to perceived inequality and injustices - such as patriarchy, polygamy, child marriage, gambling and drinking. They also dealt harshly with individuals who they identified as corrupt, which often would include village elites and the police. Much of this goodwill was squandered when they resorted to indiscriminate violence.
Another area that has been affected dramatically is the rural healthcare sector. While the Maoists have generally been supportive of immunization, these programs have greatly suffered in recent years due to poor level of social mobilization. Many international donor agencies have totally withdrawn from Nepal due to the poor security situation. One of the study revealed that in the Maoist affected districts; rates of malnutrition are exceptionally high - 62 percent in Achham, 69 in Jajarkot, 78 in Jumla and 83 in Kalikot. These rates of malnutrition are worse than what is evident in the current emergencies that the world is paying attention to - 63 percent in North Korea and 52 percent in Ethiopia and Afghanistan. According to the World Health Organization any region with 40 percent of malnutrition is a serious public health concern.
Even though the country is facing a humanitarian crisis of massive proportion, the political parties, the Maoists and the royalists have paid scant attention to the pressing needs of the people. If the poor socio-economic conditions drag on and nothing is done to alleviate poverty and suffering of the people the good will toward the peace process will evaporate.
Emerging Scenario after Feb 1, Royal Coup
His Majesty’s King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev sacked the Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba government on February 1, 2005 and decided to form a councils of ministers under his Chairmanship to “fulfill the people’s desire for the restoration of peace and security and to activate the democratic dispensation soon”. With this the King has declared a state of emergency with immediate effect throughout the Kingdom in accordance with the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990 article 115(1), as a serious crisis has been arisen in the Kingdom’s sovereignty, integrity and security. The top political leaders and the student leaders were kept under the house arrest or they were taken into the custody. Although the State of Emergency was suspend after three months and many of these political parties were released from their house arrest or from the custody but the international community have not approved this move. The international community particularly the US, UK and the India doubt on the move of the king towards the damage to the Democracy.
King Gyanendra's seizure of power and arrest of Democratic Party leaders on February 1, 2005 will likely aid the Maoist insurgency and intensify the civil war. This move by the king has alienated his people further from the monarchy by displaying clearly that he has no intention of being a constitutional monarch. Although he has placed the blame on every quarter of the Nepalese political structure the question is whether the Nepalese people are willing to believe his action to be one for the benefit of the Nepalese people. If the argument about the need for emergency flowing from the palace is that it was required to reinvent democracy then the three year period which the King claims power and promises to restore democracy is circumspect. This considering the statement that the dismissal of the government nominated by him has “failed to make necessary arrangements to hold election by April and promote democracy, the sovereignty of the people and life and property”. He has in fact strengthened the hand of the Maoists who have been proclaiming a new democratic socio-economic system and state on the ideology of removing poverty, injustice and exploitation.
The king and his new ministers have argued that only a strong, authoritarian government can deliver peace. The newly appointed deputy premier, Tulsi Giri, argued that Nepal is acting no differently than the U.S. after September 11, 2001, "Every country has a problem which it is trying to solve", he said, "but then it's not justice that you make comments on how Nepal is dealing with it". How the king might achieve a lasting resolution of the conflict is unclear. He may envisage three scenarios but none is likely to succeed:
Holding Talks: The new Council of Ministers has called for negotiations with the Maoists but there is no realistic prospect. The insurgents' chairman, Prachanda, their spokesman, Krishna Bahadur Mahara and other figures have reiterated that they will not deal with the king. Even if they were to come to the table talks between forces representing the extremes of the political spectrum would be unlikely to deliver a stable long-term settlement. More likely, the Maoists would only use them as a tactical diversion and a means for weakening the monarchy further.
Military Solution: Even if the generals recognize that a knock-out military victory is impossible many of them will argue that a sustained offensive would weaken the Maoists enough to force them into talks without preconditions. The army has shown little capacity to hurt the rebels and military experts have been unimpressed by its progress in adapting to a counterinsurgency campaign. Since its deployment in November 2001, the military position has progressively weakened, and the RNA is now burdened with extra responsibilities, which will distract it from frontline fighting. State security forces, which now have to guard against unrest from the political mainstream, will be even less likely to win support and develop improved intelligence capacity. Moreover, the royal coup will likely prove a recruiting boon for the Maoists, particularly from disaffected leftist party activists.
Maoist collapse: Ever since the Maoists' plenary meeting in August 2004, Katmandu government and diplomatic circles have been buzzing with talk of serious splits within their leadership. Many analysts hope that such internal tensions will fatally divide the movement. Similar speculation has frequently proved groundless. The Maoists do have differences over strategy but they remain disciplined and united. Indeed, they encourage a "two-line struggle" within the party as a way of developing policy. As long as they feel they have momentum, serious splits are not likely. Attempts to "decapitate" the insurgency by arresting or killing key leaders would at best entrench local warlords and groups rather than produce a total collapse. Moreover, a negotiated settlement - the goal of any realistic strategy - would be far easier to reach with a unified Maoist leadership than a series of regional splinter movements.
The immediate political impact of the royal coup is almost entirely negative in terms of the state response to the Maoist challenge. While royalist claims that Nepal needs a strong hand on the helm may sound reasonable from a distance, the reality is that the king's actions have dramatically destabilized the ship of state. An authoritarian grip on the levers of power means little when the government's writ barely extends beyond Katmandu and a few other urban areas.
The assault on democratic parties and institutions strengthens the Maoists and increases the likelihood that the mainstream parties will join the rebels in a loose alliance against the king. However, if such an alliance is structured the fact that the Maoists are not only the best organized and most determined political force in the country but also armed and violent gives them excellent chances to control it. They will seek to co-opt other parties and use them to achieve their long-standing goals. The chances that this could result in some form of Maoist victory have been greatly increased.
« return.