TakingITGlobal - Panorama - Potential success...

Published on: Oct 13, 2004

Topic:

Type: Opinions

https://www.tigweb.org/express/panorama/article.html?ContentID=4463

For an analytical purpose, the present political crisis that my country, Nepal, is beset by may be split down into two parts. At one level of analysis, it may be said that first part has stemmed from the significant armed attempt by the CPN (Maoist) to establish a People's Republic accompanied by the significant armed resistance by the state to that attempt. The second part has resulted from the strong opposition of the move of the king by major political parties, or “regression’’ to use the term frequently used by major political parties. This article confines itself to the former.

The history of the former dates back to 2052 B.S. (1996 A.D). In the early years of the history of the former, the armed attempt to establish a People’s Republic by the CPN (Maoist) was not significant enough to make the then governments take it as seriously as it is taken at the moment. The then governments were either unaware of or overlooked the fact that it was potentially significant enough to take it as seriously as it is taken now. The governments reacted to that attempt as if it were possible to neutralize it by means of the armed resistance. The way they reacted to that attempt produced the opposite, unexpected and devastating result. It is only after the emergence of this devastating result that the governments formed thereafter recognized that the problem that the armed struggle between Maoist armed rebels and Royal Nepali Armies has caused cannot be resolved by the use of the military force.

The way the present government is reacting to the attempt to establish a People’s Republic by the CPN (Maoist) seems to be a radical shift from the way the governments in the past (governments formed prior to the realization on the part of the government that peace talk is the only best possible way to settle this stand-off) reacted to that attempt. The success of peace talk hinges upon the being ready of both sides involved in the conflict to give up some of their demands. The second round of the talk between the state and the CPN (Maoist) failed because although the CPN (Maoist) gave up its demand for People’s Republic which contradicts every demand that the government has, the government did not become ready to give up any of its demands that contradict the demands of the CPN (Maoist).

The whole of the demands that the CPN (Maoist) is waging what it calls 'people’s war’ for, and that of the demands that the agent of parliamentary multiparty democratic forces i.e. government has been mobilizing armies for can be broken down into two parts for an analytical purpose. The first parts of the whole of their demands revolve around socioeconomic transformation of the country. They do not contradict each other at least at the present level of discussion on the kind of socio-economic transformation they advocate. The second parts of the whole of their demands are fundamentally opposed. The second part of the whole of the demands of CPN(Maoist) is made up by the demand to establish a People's Republic whereas that of the whole of the demands of the government is made up by the demand to make the existing parliamentary multiparty system continue to exist. The second parts of the whole of the demands are mutually exclusive. The existence of one means a lack of the existence of another. One exists because another does not exist. The success of the peace talk would become possible only when both the government and the CPN (Maoist) become ready to give up some of the second part of their demands to allow some of the second part of the demands of the other to exist. That the government and CPN (Maoist) should become ready to give up some of the second part of their demands to allow some of the second part of the demands of the other to exist is another way of saying that the government and CPN (Moist) should become ready to accept some of the second part of the demands of the other. The fact that the second round of peace talk ended without concrete progress can be rightly explained by this assumption. The then government acted either knowingly or unknowingly in the second round of the talk as if there were standoff over the first parts of the whole of its demands and the demands of the CPN (Maoist). They insisted that because the standoff over the second parts of these demands is not important, CPN (Maoist) should forget it. The CPN (Maoist) insisted that at the time of the second round of the talk that a constituent assembly is the demand it can not overlook like other demands that are inconsistent with what is usually called philosophy of democracy. This means that it then became ready to give up some of its demands making up the second part of the whole of its demands (e.g. People’s Republic). It became ready to give up some of its demands making up the second part of the whole of its demands is another way of saying that it became ready to accept some of the demands of the government making up the 'second part' of the whole of the government's demands.

The real attempt to ensure the success of the peace talk involves being ready of both the government and the CPN (Maoist) to give up some of the second part of their demands to allow some of the second part of the demands of the other to exist. In the second round of the peace talk, only part of this real attempt was made by the CPN (Maoist). It is the government who should have made another remaining part of the attempt. The government did not become ready to give up any of its demands contained in the second part of its whole demands. It means it did not make the remaining part of the real attempt to ensure the success of the peace talk, despite the fact that the CPN (Maoist) made one part of that attempt. In the second round of the peace talk the then government should have given up its demand not to create a new constitution by a constituent assembly (the demand forming part of the second part of its whole demands) to give the demand of the CPN (Maoist) to create a new constitution by a constituent assembly (the demand forming part of the second part of its whole demands) a chance to be fulfilled. But it did not do so, and the result was that the peace talk failed.

In the end, I would like to say as the crux of this article that it is usually true to say that the end of armed conflict is subject to the agreement by both sides involved in the conflict on a set of things consisting of two sub-sets, the first including things one side has been being opposed to, and the second including things that another side has been being opposed to. The fact that the end of armed conflict through peace talk hinges upon such an agreement between both sides involved in the conflict forms the logic that the peace talk usually or even inevitably operates on. If peace talk is not allowed to operate on its own inherent logic, the peace talk can never end with concrete progress. It is more likely that both the government and the CPN (Maoist) endeavor to the best of their ability to replace this usually inherent logic with the kind of logic that is incompatible with this inherent logic and that is self-centric and therefore would benefit one side only. Therefore, it should not be forgotten that the peace talk between the state and the CPN (Maoist) should be allowed to operate on its inherent balanced logic but not on an intentionally created unbalanced logic.

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by Ajit Rai
Published on: Oct 13, 2004
Topic:
Type: Opinions
https://www.tigweb.org/express/panorama/article.html?ContentID=4463


For an analytical purpose, the present political crisis that my country, Nepal, is beset by may be split down into two parts. At one level of analysis, it may be said that first part has stemmed from the significant armed attempt by the CPN (Maoist) to establish a People's Republic accompanied by the significant armed resistance by the state to that attempt. The second part has resulted from the strong opposition of the move of the king by major political parties, or “regression’’ to use the term frequently used by major political parties. This article confines itself to the former. The history of the former dates back to 2052 B.S. (1996 A.D). In the early years of the history of the former, the armed attempt to establish a People’s Republic by the CPN (Maoist) was not significant enough to make the then governments take it as seriously as it is taken at the moment. The then governments were either unaware of or overlooked the fact that it was potentially significant enough to take it as seriously as it is taken now. The governments reacted to that attempt as if it were possible to neutralize it by means of the armed resistance. The way they reacted to that attempt produced the opposite, unexpected and devastating result. It is only after the emergence of this devastating result that the governments formed thereafter recognized that the problem that the armed struggle between Maoist armed rebels and Royal Nepali Armies has caused cannot be resolved by the use of the military force. The way the present government is reacting to the attempt to establish a People’s Republic by the CPN (Maoist) seems to be a radical shift from the way the governments in the past (governments formed prior to the realization on the part of the government that peace talk is the only best possible way to settle this stand-off) reacted to that attempt. The success of peace talk hinges upon the being ready of both sides involved in the conflict to give up some of their demands. The second round of the talk between the state and the CPN (Maoist) failed because although the CPN (Maoist) gave up its demand for People’s Republic which contradicts every demand that the government has, the government did not become ready to give up any of its demands that contradict the demands of the CPN (Maoist). The whole of the demands that the CPN (Maoist) is waging what it calls 'people’s war’ for, and that of the demands that the agent of parliamentary multiparty democratic forces i.e. government has been mobilizing armies for can be broken down into two parts for an analytical purpose. The first parts of the whole of their demands revolve around socioeconomic transformation of the country. They do not contradict each other at least at the present level of discussion on the kind of socio-economic transformation they advocate. The second parts of the whole of their demands are fundamentally opposed. The second part of the whole of the demands of CPN(Maoist) is made up by the demand to establish a People's Republic whereas that of the whole of the demands of the government is made up by the demand to make the existing parliamentary multiparty system continue to exist. The second parts of the whole of the demands are mutually exclusive. The existence of one means a lack of the existence of another. One exists because another does not exist. The success of the peace talk would become possible only when both the government and the CPN (Maoist) become ready to give up some of the second part of their demands to allow some of the second part of the demands of the other to exist. That the government and CPN (Maoist) should become ready to give up some of the second part of their demands to allow some of the second part of the demands of the other to exist is another way of saying that the government and CPN (Moist) should become ready to accept some of the second part of the demands of the other. The fact that the second round of peace talk ended without concrete progress can be rightly explained by this assumption. The then government acted either knowingly or unknowingly in the second round of the talk as if there were standoff over the first parts of the whole of its demands and the demands of the CPN (Maoist). They insisted that because the standoff over the second parts of these demands is not important, CPN (Maoist) should forget it. The CPN (Maoist) insisted that at the time of the second round of the talk that a constituent assembly is the demand it can not overlook like other demands that are inconsistent with what is usually called philosophy of democracy. This means that it then became ready to give up some of its demands making up the second part of the whole of its demands (e.g. People’s Republic). It became ready to give up some of its demands making up the second part of the whole of its demands is another way of saying that it became ready to accept some of the demands of the government making up the 'second part' of the whole of the government's demands. The real attempt to ensure the success of the peace talk involves being ready of both the government and the CPN (Maoist) to give up some of the second part of their demands to allow some of the second part of the demands of the other to exist. In the second round of the peace talk, only part of this real attempt was made by the CPN (Maoist). It is the government who should have made another remaining part of the attempt. The government did not become ready to give up any of its demands contained in the second part of its whole demands. It means it did not make the remaining part of the real attempt to ensure the success of the peace talk, despite the fact that the CPN (Maoist) made one part of that attempt. In the second round of the peace talk the then government should have given up its demand not to create a new constitution by a constituent assembly (the demand forming part of the second part of its whole demands) to give the demand of the CPN (Maoist) to create a new constitution by a constituent assembly (the demand forming part of the second part of its whole demands) a chance to be fulfilled. But it did not do so, and the result was that the peace talk failed. In the end, I would like to say as the crux of this article that it is usually true to say that the end of armed conflict is subject to the agreement by both sides involved in the conflict on a set of things consisting of two sub-sets, the first including things one side has been being opposed to, and the second including things that another side has been being opposed to. The fact that the end of armed conflict through peace talk hinges upon such an agreement between both sides involved in the conflict forms the logic that the peace talk usually or even inevitably operates on. If peace talk is not allowed to operate on its own inherent logic, the peace talk can never end with concrete progress. It is more likely that both the government and the CPN (Maoist) endeavor to the best of their ability to replace this usually inherent logic with the kind of logic that is incompatible with this inherent logic and that is self-centric and therefore would benefit one side only. Therefore, it should not be forgotten that the peace talk between the state and the CPN (Maoist) should be allowed to operate on its inherent balanced logic but not on an intentionally created unbalanced logic. « return.