TakingITGlobal - Panorama - Are economic...

Published on: Dec 7, 2003

Topic:

Type: Opinions

https://www.tigweb.org/express/panorama/article.html?ContentID=2454

The effectiveness of economic sanctions as a powerful foreign policy tool is debatable. The question ‘to what extent are economic sanctions effective without the threat of military intervention?’ assumes that economic sanctions are to some extent effective without the threat of military intervention, that there is no chance of them being at all ineffective. This could be seen as a rather large assumption to make, however for the sake of this essay we will assume that economic sanctions are, to some extent, effective. My own belief is that economic sanctions have the ability to be reasonably effective in promoting changes within nation-states, but only under certain conditions and more often than not it seems that the local population is punished when sanctions are put in place, rather than the state.

In this essay I will examine the reasons for the beliefs I hold, discussing two cases where economic sanctions have been put in place against a country to change its domestic policies. I will begin by examining what economic sanctions are, how they are used, and how they relate to international political economy. I will go on to discuss how they were used against South Africa and Iraq, and how effective they were in each of these cases. I will go in depth into the situations in these two cases, as they provide the evidence I need to support my hypothesis on the effectiveness of economic sanctions without the threat of military intervention. I will conclude by discussing how economic sanctions should be used in the future and in what cases.

The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines ‘sanction’ as a ‘law, decree’, a ‘penalty for disobedience’, and ‘economic or military action by State(s) to coerce another into conformity with international norms of conduct.’ It is obvious then, combining all these definitions, that an economic sanction is a trade law or action created by a State to punish another for not obeying international norms of conduct. There are many types of economic sanctions including import restrictions, boycotts, and embargoes that prevent exports to another country. Economic sanctions are used in international political economy as a tool for foreign policy, using trade as a way to punish a nation. ‘If wealth is power, then trade is both’. Economic sanctions are used as another way to try and force a state to implement changes before military intervention is used. The reason for this is that just war theory, which is the theory of war that most states and international organisations use, says that war/military intervention should be a last resort. Therefore economic sanctions provide a way to punish a nation without the military intervention. However the effectiveness of this is debatable, as I have already stated.
I will begin by looking at the case of apartheid in South Africa. In 1948 the Nationalist party took power in South Africa and applied a tough policy of racial segregation, this was called apartheid. Native Africans were discriminated against in every possible walk of life. In April of 1960 police killed sixty-four Africans in Sharpeville. This led to worldwide condemnation of the apartheid regime. In 1976 hundreds of blacks were killed in riots in the Soweto township. These are just two of the discriminatory events that happened between 1948 and the end of apartheid. Although economic sanctions may not have been the only factor that led to the end of apartheid, they certainly played a primary role in bringing the regime to its end. In 1961 African states called for economic and political sanctions against South Africa. By 1962 the United Nations General Assembly had advised members to stop diplomatic relations with South Africa. In 1963 the United Nations (UN) adopted an arms embargo that led to member countries voluntarily ceasing shipments of arms to South Africa. This embargo stayed in place till the end of apartheid in 1994. In 1964 the International Conference on Economic Sanctions against South Africa was held, forty-four countries attended, including South Africa. It was concluded at the conference that total economic sanctions would be feasible and effective in the fight against racial discrimination and in particular apartheid in South Africa.

In 1964 India put in place a complete embargo on trade with South Africa. In 1977 British Commonwealth nations adopted the Gleneagles Agreement which called for a ban on sports contact with South Africa. In 1984 one hundred and nineteen of the three hundred and fifty US companies operating in South Africa committed themselves ‘to press for broad changes in South African society, including the repeal of all apartheid laws and policies.’ Many of these companies went on to leave the country to show their opposition to apartheid. It was this action, I believe, that was one of the key factors in the effectiveness of the economic sanctions in South Africa. American companies played a huge role in the economy of the country and their anti-apartheid stance caused economic problems for the state.

Another key factor was the sanction put in place in August of 1985. It restricted economic growth by forcing the regime to create current account surpluses and making sure capital outflows continued. The sanction led to South Africa being excluded from the world stock of savings because the financiers and bankers saw South Africa as a risk. The socio-economic state of affairs made them unsure of the security of investments made there, and therefore they stopped recommending it as a place to invest. All of these factors and many more, which I have not had time to mention, led to economic sanctions working very effectively as a tool against apartheid. In the case of South Africa the conditions were right for sanctions to work, there was enough foreign input into the country that sanctions forced the government change the regime. In April of 1994 the first South African democratic election was held with people queuing for kilometers to vote, people from every race. Nelson Mandela was elected the first black President of South Africa. It had taken a long time for the policies and laws behind apartheid to be abolished but they were finally gone, with the help of economic sanctions.

The second case, economic sanctions in Iraq, shows that sanctions can also be highly ineffective. On the 2nd of August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait. Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz had accused Kuwait of stealing Iraqi oil in July 1990 and claimed that Kuwait had built military posts on Iraqi land. United States President George Bush froze Iraqi assets and banned all trade relations. On the 4th of August the European Community called for the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and imposed broad sanctions. On the 5th of August Japan and China also imposed sanctions. This led to the first gulf war. After the war, sanctions continued to be imposed by the United Nations Security Council in the attempt to remove Saddam Hussein and his dictatorship. These sanctions are still in place, although the UN Security Council is considering removing them now that Hussein and his dictatorship have apparently disappeared.
These sanctions were a true example of effecting the unintended population and not the intended state. They targeted the most unprotected and fragile members of the Iraqi society including the poor, sick, elderly, newborn and the young. The UN sanctions committee denied Iraq pencils, spare parts, computer equipment and air-conditioned trucks. The trucks were necessary to stop any food that goes to the country from going off while being transported around therefore meaning that much of the food that arrived there went off before it could be fed to anyone. It has been said that ‘the UN Security Council bears considerable, if not primary moral responsibility for the suffering and death of [over one million] Iraqi civilians. This is unacceptable! The sanctions were not put in place to punish the civilians and have not to any stretch of the imagination done enough harm to the Hussein dictatorship. Without military intervention, economic sanctions have not worked at all effectively as a method for punishing the Iraqi government.

These two cases are exact opposites; South Africa proved that economic sanctions can be highly effective while Iraq showed that economic sanctions can destroy a population, without affecting a state. The reason I have used these two cases is that they show how economic sanctions should be used. In South Africa there were significant amounts of foreign influence, investment and companies. In Iraq there was little of any of these. The amount of foreign influence, investment and companies is what I think it comes down to. In a country with little of this, economic sanctions will ruin the country, while in a country where there is much it will help to change the state. Therefore I believe economic sanctions have the ability to be reasonably effective without military intervention, but only in certain situations. If there is little foreign influence in a country, then economic sanctions will destroy the local population and will have little effect without military intervention.

According to the authors of ‘Economic Sanctions Reconsidered’ sanctions have been successful in thirty-four percent of the cases overall. I am not sure that thirty-four percent is high enough to say that economic sanctions are very effective overall, and so I believe that overall economic sanctions are relatively ineffective without military intervention. Occasionally cases like the one in South Africa may appear and sanctions may work, but overall I agree with Richard Haas, trade sanctions more often than not punish the unintended population rather that the government leaders. Economic sanctions are relatively ineffective without military intervention.
For all footnotes contact me: fk.mckenzie@clear.net.nz

Please note that this article was written March 2003 and therefore some examples have subsequently changed.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Arnove, Anthony Ed., ‘Iraq Under Siege: The Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War’ (Cambridge, Massachusetts: South End Press, 2000)

Balaam, David N. and Michael Veseth ‘Introduction to International Political Economy 2nd Edition’ (New Jersey, USA: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 2001) pp.125-129

Das, Ramon, ‘Ethics and Economic Sanctions: The Case of Iraq’ (Victoria University of Wellington: PHIL 106 Coursebook, 2002) pp.296-323

Fowler, H.W & F.G, Edited by J.B Sykes, ‘The Concise Oxford Dictionary, Seventh Edition’ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) p.266

Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott and Kimberly Ann Elliott, ‘Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy 2nd Edition’ (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1990) pp.91-114, 221-248, 283-298

Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott and Kimberly Ann Elliott, ‘Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: Supplemental Case Histories 2nd Edition’ (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1990) pp.226-238

Ovenden, Keith and Tony Cole, ‘Apartheid and International Finance: A Program for Change’ (Victoria, Australia: Penguin Books Ltd, 1989) pp.187-206

Segal, Ronald Ed., ‘Sanctions against South Africa’ (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books Ltd, 1964) pp.7-14

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by Fiona McKenzie
Published on: Dec 7, 2003
Topic:
Type: Opinions
https://www.tigweb.org/express/panorama/article.html?ContentID=2454


The effectiveness of economic sanctions as a powerful foreign policy tool is debatable. The question ‘to what extent are economic sanctions effective without the threat of military intervention?’ assumes that economic sanctions are to some extent effective without the threat of military intervention, that there is no chance of them being at all ineffective. This could be seen as a rather large assumption to make, however for the sake of this essay we will assume that economic sanctions are, to some extent, effective. My own belief is that economic sanctions have the ability to be reasonably effective in promoting changes within nation-states, but only under certain conditions and more often than not it seems that the local population is punished when sanctions are put in place, rather than the state. In this essay I will examine the reasons for the beliefs I hold, discussing two cases where economic sanctions have been put in place against a country to change its domestic policies. I will begin by examining what economic sanctions are, how they are used, and how they relate to international political economy. I will go on to discuss how they were used against South Africa and Iraq, and how effective they were in each of these cases. I will go in depth into the situations in these two cases, as they provide the evidence I need to support my hypothesis on the effectiveness of economic sanctions without the threat of military intervention. I will conclude by discussing how economic sanctions should be used in the future and in what cases. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines ‘sanction’ as a ‘law, decree’, a ‘penalty for disobedience’, and ‘economic or military action by State(s) to coerce another into conformity with international norms of conduct.’ It is obvious then, combining all these definitions, that an economic sanction is a trade law or action created by a State to punish another for not obeying international norms of conduct. There are many types of economic sanctions including import restrictions, boycotts, and embargoes that prevent exports to another country. Economic sanctions are used in international political economy as a tool for foreign policy, using trade as a way to punish a nation. ‘If wealth is power, then trade is both’. Economic sanctions are used as another way to try and force a state to implement changes before military intervention is used. The reason for this is that just war theory, which is the theory of war that most states and international organisations use, says that war/military intervention should be a last resort. Therefore economic sanctions provide a way to punish a nation without the military intervention. However the effectiveness of this is debatable, as I have already stated. I will begin by looking at the case of apartheid in South Africa. In 1948 the Nationalist party took power in South Africa and applied a tough policy of racial segregation, this was called apartheid. Native Africans were discriminated against in every possible walk of life. In April of 1960 police killed sixty-four Africans in Sharpeville. This led to worldwide condemnation of the apartheid regime. In 1976 hundreds of blacks were killed in riots in the Soweto township. These are just two of the discriminatory events that happened between 1948 and the end of apartheid. Although economic sanctions may not have been the only factor that led to the end of apartheid, they certainly played a primary role in bringing the regime to its end. In 1961 African states called for economic and political sanctions against South Africa. By 1962 the United Nations General Assembly had advised members to stop diplomatic relations with South Africa. In 1963 the United Nations (UN) adopted an arms embargo that led to member countries voluntarily ceasing shipments of arms to South Africa. This embargo stayed in place till the end of apartheid in 1994. In 1964 the International Conference on Economic Sanctions against South Africa was held, forty-four countries attended, including South Africa. It was concluded at the conference that total economic sanctions would be feasible and effective in the fight against racial discrimination and in particular apartheid in South Africa. In 1964 India put in place a complete embargo on trade with South Africa. In 1977 British Commonwealth nations adopted the Gleneagles Agreement which called for a ban on sports contact with South Africa. In 1984 one hundred and nineteen of the three hundred and fifty US companies operating in South Africa committed themselves ‘to press for broad changes in South African society, including the repeal of all apartheid laws and policies.’ Many of these companies went on to leave the country to show their opposition to apartheid. It was this action, I believe, that was one of the key factors in the effectiveness of the economic sanctions in South Africa. American companies played a huge role in the economy of the country and their anti-apartheid stance caused economic problems for the state. Another key factor was the sanction put in place in August of 1985. It restricted economic growth by forcing the regime to create current account surpluses and making sure capital outflows continued. The sanction led to South Africa being excluded from the world stock of savings because the financiers and bankers saw South Africa as a risk. The socio-economic state of affairs made them unsure of the security of investments made there, and therefore they stopped recommending it as a place to invest. All of these factors and many more, which I have not had time to mention, led to economic sanctions working very effectively as a tool against apartheid. In the case of South Africa the conditions were right for sanctions to work, there was enough foreign input into the country that sanctions forced the government change the regime. In April of 1994 the first South African democratic election was held with people queuing for kilometers to vote, people from every race. Nelson Mandela was elected the first black President of South Africa. It had taken a long time for the policies and laws behind apartheid to be abolished but they were finally gone, with the help of economic sanctions. The second case, economic sanctions in Iraq, shows that sanctions can also be highly ineffective. On the 2nd of August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait. Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz had accused Kuwait of stealing Iraqi oil in July 1990 and claimed that Kuwait had built military posts on Iraqi land. United States President George Bush froze Iraqi assets and banned all trade relations. On the 4th of August the European Community called for the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and imposed broad sanctions. On the 5th of August Japan and China also imposed sanctions. This led to the first gulf war. After the war, sanctions continued to be imposed by the United Nations Security Council in the attempt to remove Saddam Hussein and his dictatorship. These sanctions are still in place, although the UN Security Council is considering removing them now that Hussein and his dictatorship have apparently disappeared. These sanctions were a true example of effecting the unintended population and not the intended state. They targeted the most unprotected and fragile members of the Iraqi society including the poor, sick, elderly, newborn and the young. The UN sanctions committee denied Iraq pencils, spare parts, computer equipment and air-conditioned trucks. The trucks were necessary to stop any food that goes to the country from going off while being transported around therefore meaning that much of the food that arrived there went off before it could be fed to anyone. It has been said that ‘the UN Security Council bears considerable, if not primary moral responsibility for the suffering and death of [over one million] Iraqi civilians. This is unacceptable! The sanctions were not put in place to punish the civilians and have not to any stretch of the imagination done enough harm to the Hussein dictatorship. Without military intervention, economic sanctions have not worked at all effectively as a method for punishing the Iraqi government. These two cases are exact opposites; South Africa proved that economic sanctions can be highly effective while Iraq showed that economic sanctions can destroy a population, without affecting a state. The reason I have used these two cases is that they show how economic sanctions should be used. In South Africa there were significant amounts of foreign influence, investment and companies. In Iraq there was little of any of these. The amount of foreign influence, investment and companies is what I think it comes down to. In a country with little of this, economic sanctions will ruin the country, while in a country where there is much it will help to change the state. Therefore I believe economic sanctions have the ability to be reasonably effective without military intervention, but only in certain situations. If there is little foreign influence in a country, then economic sanctions will destroy the local population and will have little effect without military intervention. According to the authors of ‘Economic Sanctions Reconsidered’ sanctions have been successful in thirty-four percent of the cases overall. I am not sure that thirty-four percent is high enough to say that economic sanctions are very effective overall, and so I believe that overall economic sanctions are relatively ineffective without military intervention. Occasionally cases like the one in South Africa may appear and sanctions may work, but overall I agree with Richard Haas, trade sanctions more often than not punish the unintended population rather that the government leaders. Economic sanctions are relatively ineffective without military intervention. For all footnotes contact me: fk.mckenzie@clear.net.nz Please note that this article was written March 2003 and therefore some examples have subsequently changed. BIBLIOGRAPHY Arnove, Anthony Ed., ‘Iraq Under Siege: The Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War’ (Cambridge, Massachusetts: South End Press, 2000) Balaam, David N. and Michael Veseth ‘Introduction to International Political Economy 2nd Edition’ (New Jersey, USA: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 2001) pp.125-129 Das, Ramon, ‘Ethics and Economic Sanctions: The Case of Iraq’ (Victoria University of Wellington: PHIL 106 Coursebook, 2002) pp.296-323 Fowler, H.W & F.G, Edited by J.B Sykes, ‘The Concise Oxford Dictionary, Seventh Edition’ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) p.266 Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott and Kimberly Ann Elliott, ‘Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy 2nd Edition’ (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1990) pp.91-114, 221-248, 283-298 Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott and Kimberly Ann Elliott, ‘Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: Supplemental Case Histories 2nd Edition’ (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1990) pp.226-238 Ovenden, Keith and Tony Cole, ‘Apartheid and International Finance: A Program for Change’ (Victoria, Australia: Penguin Books Ltd, 1989) pp.187-206 Segal, Ronald Ed., ‘Sanctions against South Africa’ (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books Ltd, 1964) pp.7-14 « return.