To start with, it is only recently did the international community start looking at India as a potential balancing factor for the US or China in the APR. This is not unrelated to its tremendous economic performance reflected by GDP growth rates approaching 10% per year in the past 10 years. In fact, the well-discussed BRIC Report estimates that Indian GDP will surpass that of Japan by 2040 (Jain, 2006), a miracle which can be explained by referring to English speaking India's specialisation in the information-technology business, which makes it a primary destination for outsourcing (Friedman, 2006).
However, just like China always claims to still be a developing country, one can not ignore the harsh reality for most Indians; the absolute number of people living below the poverty line in populous India is increasing and that its PPP-GDP only accounts for half that of China (Kueh, 2006). In this context, it is safe to assert that India still has a long way to go before it can catch up to the US or China, let alone supplant them.
Similarly, India faces significant internal problems that might jeopardize its efforts to get involved in world affairs. The most salient is the conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir. Although most analysts doubt this will prevent India from becoming a major power in the region and although peace negotiations are in progress since 2004 (Ganguly, 2006), it remains that, especially after last week's bombings in Mumbai, these tensions could well degenerate into a nuclear war, which could certainly weaken India and slow its economic growth.
The global political situation resulting would depend on whether the United States sides with its long-term ally, Pakistan, or with one it increasingly considers as a strategic partner, India. In fact, being the world largest democracy and being located between China and the Middle East as well as being the home to the world's second largest Muslim population, India is now playing a prominent role in the ongoing War on Terror instigated by the United States. This event had the ironic effect of bringing together the world leader with a country that it marginalized since its 1998 nuclear tests. In the light of this process, one could argue that India is aligning itself with the US and will thus not push to affect change in an opposite direction in the APR.
However, one has to pay attention to the history of the US-India relations to make predictions about their future. At the onset of the Cold War, India positioned itself in the Non-Aligned Movement before siding with the USSR, after the normalization of Sino-American relations in 1972. Hence, India and the US do not have a lasting record of cooperation and friendship and neither does India and China, especially due to intimidation and border conflicts. However, there are reasons to believe that India may grow closer to China than to the US, although it will not overtly alienate or antagonize the latter, whose prevalent influence might however diminish.
Recent years have seen an intensification of Sino-India two-way trade (from USD 1 billion in late 1990s to USD 13 billion in 2004-05 (IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Year Book, 2003-4, c.f. Jain and Mayer, N.A.), which is likely to increase even more due to the re-opening of the Silk Route at Nathu La pass. While examining these developments, some may think that China is simply seeking more allies in response to its isolation in the Post-Tiananmen Square period and turned towards India because of its persisting dislike of Japan, but some may also think - especially after they undertook their first joint naval exercise in 2003 (Saint-Mézard and Chin, 2006) - that China and India are plotting to get the Americans out of Asia.
Conscious of the implications that would have for their overall hegemony in the region and being opposed to India's project of building a pipeline to Iran, a country of the ''Axis of Evil'', the Bush administration pledged to assist India in key dual-use technologies (such as civil nuclear power, space programmes and high technology) (Saint-Mézard and Chin, 2006). This is definitely a good deal for India, which they can not ignore in eventual political decisions relating to the US in the APR.
This does not mean that India will become a foreign policy instrument for the United States, although it is in the latter's interest to prevent Asia from being dominated by any single power that has the capacity to crowd out others (The Economist, 2006). In fact, India has its very own agenda and vision for the world and, ever since its hardly won independence from Britain; it will refuse to put itself in Japan's current security position. Neither does it want to loose its reputation of an independent power, for it would compromise its good relations with Russia, Iran and other Middle-Eastern countries.
This desire not to depend on a Western power to dictate its foreign policy does not mean India will be an isolated entity in the 21st century. To the contrary, India has increased its presence internationally, concluding many bilateral deals – with such a diverse set of countries as Sri Lanka, Chile, Singapore, South Africa and Egypt (Bilateral.org : India, 2006 ).
It recently improved its relations with Japan, as the US ally now sees India as a positive force balancing out China, at the same time as it seeks to gain from trade with the booming Indian economy (Chung, 2005). On the other hand, India is choosing partners that the US disapproves; for example, it is consolidating dialogue with the dictatorship in Myanmar to gain access to their gas, minerals and military bases (Batabyal, 2006). It also was amongst the first country to establish relations with the Republics of Central Asia (Chaturvedi, N.A.), a strategic move which can now be seen as a way to counterbalance China and Russia's actions through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), of which India is simply an observer. All in all, there is no overt, one-sided policy that is either pro or against the Americans.
Most importantly, India appears at the negotiation table of many regional and sub-regional groups, whose careful analysis go beyond the scope of this paper. Rivalry with China is a persistent cross-cutting theme of India's Look East Policy. At the same time as India's increased dialogue with the Association of South-East-Asian Nations (ASEAN) is welcomed by many small countries that distrust Japan and are scared of China. Its ascension to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996 and the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005 was seen negatively by China, who considers India as too remote to become involved in these groupings.
Although India failed to join the Asia Pacific Economic Forum (APEC), it has pursued its own interests on the South-Asian subcontinent through strengthening ties with its neighbours, partly through the establishment of the BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation), the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation Forum and the SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), all of which exclude China. There are good reasons to think that the current US administration welcomes India's ''expansionism'', as it switched from seeing its rival, China, as a ''strategic partner'' but rather as a ''competitive rival''. There is nevertheless no consensus within India as whether India should want to become part of the Big Three Alliance as suggested by Russia (Chaturvedi, N.A.); there is in fact a lot of controversy with regards to modernization, liberalization and adoption of Western values from many factions in India.
In conclusion, I do not believe that India will become a puppet of the United States in the near future, although I do not think that it will antagonize it either, in its efforts to catch up to China. Its rise as a regional power is likely to mitigate the US influence by consolidating ties between countries in the APR; truthful to its reputation of a lone actor, it is likely that India will adopt some policies in line with the Americans', and some others that do not, depending on its own national interests and those of the countries it has the strongest ties with. Although it is hard to predict future internal or external events that will impact on their position, it would not be surprising that the Indian foreign affairs and diplomatic trends will be subject to periodic modifications, as it was the case during the Cold War, which is argued to have never ended in the APR.
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