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Peace Process in Sri Lanka: 2002-2003 Printable Version PRINTABLE VERSION
by Sanjana, Sri Lanka May 15, 2003
Peace & Conflict  

  


With its refusal as yet to renounce violence, as the Irish Republican Army has in Northern Ireland, and its continuing practices of child recruitment and targeted assassinations of Tamil political opponents, the LTTE was destined to fail the US test. But the LTTE’s position is not irredeemable, and there is much that it and the government can do together in partnership to ensure that the LTTE gains the legitimacy it seeks.
At present, however, the problem is that the LTTE’s withdrawal is unlikely to be viewed favourably by the international community. Already, the United States and France have urged the LTTE to return to the negotiating table. The Indian government has also expressed its wish that the peace process continue without delay. Despite its protestations that its decision to suspend participation resulted from deliberations over a long period of time, the LTTE’s abrupt withdrawal has cost it international credibility. The imperative must therefore be for the LTTE to re-engage with the peace talks. If solving people’s hardships is the goal, there is no alternative to the negotiating table.

In a recent meeting with civil society leaders , the Head of the Political Wing of the LTTE, S.P. Tamilchelvan referred to three types of broken promises. The first concerned the resettlement of displaced persons and the constraints that the army’s presence in inhabited areas posed to such resettlement. The second was the lack of financial support for resettlement and reconstruction. The third was the undermining of the partnership between the government and LTTE due to the one-sided participation at the Washington aid conference.

Notwithstanding these concerns, the LTTE must recognise that there is a political price that it is paying for its suspension of the peace talks just prior to the much planned Tokyo donor conference in June. It could lead to a weakening of the LTTE's political credibility and a widening of its lack of political parity with the government. The Japanese government, which has invested its international credibility in the peacemaking sphere, is not likely to be pleased.

As such, the LTTE pull-out of the peace talks is a problem that needs to be jointly addressed by the government and LTTE in partnership with the international community, before the peace process is itself fatally weakened.
Persistent Problems

While much is written on the positive aspects of the peace process, serious problems remain. One can begin with the ceasefire agreement itself, which sought to bring an end to armed hostilities and engender an atmosphere conducive for negotiations. There is little reference to Human Rights in the ceasefire agreement - a loop hole which has given leeway for both parties to indulge in human rights violations throughout the past fifteen months. There is no reference in the ceasefire agreement to the recruitment of underage soldiers – child conscription was also raised in the 5th Round of Peace Talks in Berlin.

At the first round of peace talks, in Sattahip, Thailand, it was evident that the process would consist of piecemeal solutions with no clear roadmap to peace. One could argue however, that in these early stages of the process, both sides were hesitant to commit more than what was absolutely necessary to maintain the process.

The official Royal Norwegian Government statement at the end of the 4th round in Thailand had a surprise:

Responding to a proposal by the leadership of the LTTE, the parties agreed to explore a solution founded on the principle of internal self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka. The parties acknowledged that the solution has to be acceptable to all communities.
The wording here is interesting. The impetus for a federal structure comes from a response to a proposal by the leadership of the LTTE. No mention of the Sri Lankan Government. While some have argued that this provides a convenient escape route for the government since it has not committed itself to a federal solution, others see it as an indication of an attempt to enhance the legitimacy of the LTTE. Either way, it is evident that official statements are reflective of the scepticism with which both parties to the conflict view the contours of a final political-constitutional settlement.

Adding to this scepticism is the fact that the Sub-Committee on Political Matters has never met. Unofficial meeting between the Chief Negotiators of the Government and the LTTE have taken place, but there has not been any serious discussion on addressing the root causes of the conflict. Before every round of peace talks, there has also been a crisis on the ground. The incident of the trawler being blown up on the eve of the peace talks in Berlin threatened to undermine the spirit of cordiality and progress at the peace talks. As a result of these ceasefire violations on the ground, peace talks have rarely ventured beyond the immediate necessities on the ground. The lack of a guiding vision that animates the peace process is to some observers a stark premonition of their ultimate breakdown.







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Sanjana


Sanjana Hattotuwa is a Rotary World Peace Scholar presently pursuing a Masters in International Studies from the University of Queensland in Brisbane, Australia. The views expressed here are his own. He can be contacted at hatt@wow.lk.
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