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Peace, in turn, generates violence:
While the majority of external actors have the best humanitarian intentions, what is planned and what actually takes place are never the same. United Nations peacekeepers have been involved in countless operations from Bosnia, to Cambodia, Somalia, Iraq, and East Timor and none have been greatly successful. Aid is given to help conflicts be resolved, when in fact it often leads to further conflict. This section examines the role that these two actors have had in generating further violence.
The United Nations faces a number of accusations to do with the generation of further violence. A lack of willingness to take action toward the Chinese government ethnic-cleansing in Tibet or the Sudanese government in Darfur has led to violence in these areas. As Edmund Burke said, “the only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.” In 2004, a thirty-four page report from UN investigators outlined 68 cases of alleged paedophilia, rape and prostitution by UN peacekeepers in Uruguay, Pakistan, South Africa, Nepal, Tunisia and Morocco. The United Nations Operations in Somalia provided faction leaders with security contracts, currency transactions, employment, rents, and an assortment of other fringe benefits (Menkhaus and Prendergast 1995). The withdrawal of UN forces too quickly has lead to an escalation of violence all over the world (Keen 2005, 19).
A “rhetoric of neutrality” surrounds aid, and yet it continues to exacerbate, rather than resolve, conflict situations (Menkhaus and Prendergast 1995). In 1995, Somalia lacked a recognised political leadership and some multilateral institutions refused to work with the people in local politics. Aid therefore went to the “unilaterally declared” government, made up of members of the military, with emphasis put on creating a democratic government rather than reconciliation (Menkhaus and Prendergast 1995). Michael Ignatieff asserts that democracy and human rights often conflict for fragile and emerging states, and that “popular sovereignty for a majority is often achieved at the cost of ethnic cleansing for a minority” (Ignatieff 2001, 25). For those who receive aid, there is a perverse incentive in ensuring the conflict continues so that aid continues to be given. Those who do not receive aid may feel unrecognised or excluded, leading to further violence.
East Timor
In April 2006, conflict and violence took the fore in East Timor again. It began as a conflict between parts of the East Timorese military over discrimination within the military but quickly spread to violence and riots nationwide. The United Nations, who were scheduled to remove their final administration staff in May 2006, were forced to extend their deadline and Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Portugal were asked by the East Timorese Government to intervene. For East Timor, this was a renewal of the violence that has plagued the area for sixty years.
After a somewhat turbulent history of colonisation involving the Portuguese and the Dutch, East Timor was able to unilaterally declare itself independent on November 28 1975. Nine days later, the Indonesian military invaded before the declaration could be international recognised. The Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT) was formed in May 1974 to “defend the idea of the right to independence” (Taylor 1999, 26). However, its young radical members pushed for objectives and structure and in September 1974 the organisation became known as Fretilin, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor. In December 1975, after the Indonesian invasion, Fretilin launched its own military arm, known as Falintil, which began a guerrilla war with the Indonesian military. The Indonesian Government repressed the East Timorese people leading to the deaths of over two hundred thousand people because of famine and poverty (BBC 2003). In 1991, the Santa Cruz massacre occurred during the funeral of a Fretilin supporter, with Indonesian forces killing over one hundred East Timorese. This helped to exacerbate the conflict and violence already occurring.
Finally in 1999, the United Nations agreed to intervene and organised an independence referendum. Seventy-eight percent of voters favoured independence (BBC 2003). After the referendum, anti-independence militia, with the help of the Indonesian military killed over one thousand people while some quarter of the population fled to West Timor. In August 2001, an 88-member Constituent Assembly was elected, with a Fretilin majority, to write the constitution for independent East Timor. On May 20 2006, East Timor was officially granted independence, following the election of Xanana Gusmao as the first democratically elected President.
In order to deal with the consequences of the violence that occurred during particularly the Indonesian rule of East Timor, a truth and reconciliation commission was created in January 2002. United Nations peacekeepers alongside Australian and New Zealand defence force personnel moved in to help resolve any lasting conflicts. However, as this essay has suggested, peace and violence are closely linked and continued violence is a problem. In 2003, the Time New Zealand magazine published an article discussing the problems of the Falintil guerrillas who were struggling to find a place for themselves in the nation they helped to create (Clausen 2003, 41). Despite the problems which continued to haunt the new independent state, most believed resolution and reconciliation was both possible and very likely. The conflict and violence of May 2006 has changed this view and although the violence has again died down, there is more awareness now that there is a fine line between peace and violence in East Timor.
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Fi McKenzie
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